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Introduction 
This paper focuses on codes of practice in domestic (in-country) and international (out of 
country) philanthropic giving/grantmaking, their similarities and differences. Codes of 
principle and practice are interesting not so much because they accurately reflect 
differences in practice on the ground, but rather because they indicate what is 
considered important or relevant, as well as aspirational. Codes tell us what people are 
most concerned about – what is seen to be in need of regulation or reminder. 
 
The paper begins by looking at, first, the origins of demand for codes of practice in 
philanthropic giving and second, at the nature and purposes of codes. The third section 
of the paper outlines the content of three domestic, two international disaster and one 
broad international code, and discusses their similarities and differences. Finally, the 
paper considers some of the strengths and limitations of codes of practice. 
 
The Rise in Demand for Codes of Philanthropic Giving and Aid 
In the last decade a growing number of grantmaking trusts and foundations throughout 
the world, via their associations, have developed codes of good practice (Ebrahin, 2003). 
Where is the pressure for codes of practice coming from, and why?  
 
Attention to the way in which non-profit organisations in general work has arisen in part 
from a wider culture of growing concern over accountability and standards in public life 
(Cadbury, 1997; Power, 1997). In a number of countries in recent years there have been 
heavily publicised scandals in government and corporate life, leading to efforts to 
redefine and reassert expectations of acceptable conduct (Gibelman & Gelman, 2001). 
The non-profit sector, so long regarded by many as a repository of trust, has not 
completely escaped demands for greater accountability.  
 
Accountability is of heightened significance in the light of new policy agendas. 'The Third 
Way', social coalition, cross-sector alliances and partnerships are now central policy 
tenets. Government as 'steering not rowing' and the associated growth of contracting out 
creates new and complex dilemmas in relationships between organisations involved in 
public service delivery and spending public money both at home and abroad.  
Recognition of the importance of the non-profit sector has focused attention on the roles 
of non-profit organisations in a democracy, including their power without responsibility. 
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Media attention in various countries (including the US, UK and Australia) has led to 
questions about issues ranging from salaries to reserves to poor quality, and in some 
cases positively damaging, services. Throughout the world, there have been various 
recent scandals concerning fraud and misappropriation of funds within non-profit 
organisations, including foundations. Specific scandals within non-profit organisations 
have largely been explained as perpetrated by individual rogues rather than an indication 
of deeper structural problems. Nevertheless the fact that rogues have been able to 
operate undetected for significant periods of time has led to questions regarding the 
adequacy of non-profit organisation governance and accountability structures and 
processes (Ilchman and Burlingame, 1999; Crimm, 2002; Ebrahim, 2003). 
 
More generally, in various countries there is growing evidence of a loss of public trust 
and confidence in non-profit organisations including trusts and foundations (Salamon, 
1997; Henley Centre, 1997a and b; Independent Sector, 1994). This loss of public trust 
and confidence in the sector is matched by growing questioning in academic theory and 
research of the characteristics of non-profit organisations. Traditionally, non-profit 
organisations including trusts and foundations have claimed for themselves certain 
virtues and functions including a capacity for innovation, greater cost effectiveness and 
flexibility, greater efficiency, greater understanding of users, lack of bureaucracy, greater 
democracy and so on. These virtues have largely been taken for granted despite the lack 
of systematic empirical evidence to support them. More recently academic research has 
begun to question the basis for such claims (for a summary, see McIlnay, 1998; also 
see: Fleishman, 1999; Sogge, et al, 1996; Hulme and Edwards, 1990; Lewis and 
Wallace, 2000; Anheier and Leat, 2002). 
 
The new emphasis on the role of non-profit organisations in creating social capital and 
civil society has, on the one hand, provided a new (and difficult to validate empirically) 
rationale for supporting such organisations and, on the other hand, has increased the 
research and policy attention devoted to understanding what non-profits do and how 
(Cox, 1995; Crooke, 1997). Given that the social capital and civil society rationales 
attach considerable significance to the democratic styles and functions of non-profit 
organisations, issues of governance and accountability are of crucial importance (Howell 
and Pearce, 2000). 
 
Issues of public accountability arise in part from the fiscal and legal privileges conferred 
on certain categories of organisations seen as providing public benefit (i.e. charities, and 
similar categories). With growing emphasis on the role of non-profit organisations in 
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society, governments in various countries, including Australia, have sought to encourage 
such organisations by various means including creation of a conducive fiscal climate. As 
the scope and scale of taxation have grown, the value of the tax advantages enjoyed by 
charities has also increased. As the sums of 'lost' public revenue grow there is likely to 
be greater concern regarding the use of such monies.  
 
In some countries new emphasis on the roles of non-profit organisations in government 
policy has led to new awareness of the size of foundation assets and income. In addition, 
some endowed foundations have enjoyed spectacular increases in income in recent 
years due, in part, to booming property and investment values and, in part, to the 
proceeds of take-overs and mergers. In Australia some foundations have also enjoyed 
significant windfalls from the changes to tax imputation credits. 
 
The growing privatisation of provision and aid has meant that non-profit organisations 
may be in receipt of larger sums of state funding and, more significantly, instead of 
providing the ‘extras’ non-profit organisations are now regarded as central players in the 
provision of services for which governments accept some responsibility at home and 
abroad.  
 
Greater demands for accountability from government funders have largely taken the form 
of contracts for service. These have not only increased and formalised accountability 
responsibilities but also created tensions in some organisations. These tensions have 
concerned the appropriateness of government funders' accountability demands, criteria 
and processes; parallel relationships with varying accountability to other stakeholders; 
and effects on internal governance. One wider effect has been to raise questions about 
the accountability and governance of all non-profit organisations, whether on contract or 
not. In some cases, foundations have been asking more detailed questions of those they 
fund, which in turn has led to greater self-scrutiny. 
 
Greater value of contracts and pass through funding to grantmakers from other donors 
has created an incentive for non-profit organisations to police their own world. Greater 
accountability not only protects good guys from bad guys, but may also raise barriers to 
new entrants. 
 
Partly in response to some of the trends above, non-profit organisations, including 
foundations, have increasingly employed paid, professional technical and general 
managerial staff (Kramer, 1987; Kramer, 1990; Bruce and Leat, 1993; Brown et al, 
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2000). On the one hand, this may be seen as a way of making foundations and other 
non-profit organisations both better managed and more accountable. But, at the same 
time, the growth of paid professional staff within non-profit organisations raises new 
tensions in governance and accountability. In fund-raising particular concerns have 
arisen concerning increasing competition and adoption of ‘commercial’ practices. 
 
One further strand in sources of pressure for change in governance and accountability of 
foundations and other non-profit organisations has been the ideology of consumerism. 
Like the business and public sectors, non-profit organisations have been subject to 
demands that the end-user, the consumer, be taken into account (Leat, 1988). Some 
foundations have responded to this movement by including end users in decision-making 
structures and processes. Others have responded by giving priority to grant applications 
from 'user-led' organisations. This may not only increase the complexity of decision 
making and appropriate accountability from grant recipients, but may also raise 
questions about foundations' own governance and accountability. 
 
Codes of practice are only one of a range of accountability mechanisms adopted by non-
profit organisations (Ebrahim, 2003). As illustrated in the following section, codes 
function to respond to some of the concerns above, but there are some interesting 
questions concerning why codes have been the response to these pressures for greater 
accountability, the number of overlapping codes and the players and processes involved 
in code-making/negotiation. It is also worth noting here that in Australia in order to 
receive Government money international aid organisations go through an accreditation 
process requiring, inter alia, that they are signatories to the ACFOA Code of Conduct; 
domestic organisations do not face this requirement. Why is there this difference, and 
how long will it be before government starts ‘reading across’ from its treatment of 
international aid organisations? These questions are beyond the scope of this paper (for 
a discussion of the wider issues of regulation and code making see, for example, 
Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Ogus, 2001). 
 
The Nature and Purposes of Codes 
Very broadly, codes of conduct arise where accountability between two, or more, parties 
is acknowledged but where there are operational difficulties in monitoring activities. 
Codes are thus particularly relevant to non-profit organisations where purchasers/donors 
and consumers/end-users are not the same and may move literally and figuratively in 
very different worlds. Paradoxically, the growth of codes has come in the context of wider 
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moves for ‘de-regulation’ – but, as Power (1997) notes, de-regulation is probably more 
accurately described as regulatory experimentation with self regulation. If ‘de-regulation’ 
is seen in this light codes have an obvious place. 
 
Most codes are designed to provide reassurance, as well as some degree of protection. 
But who or what is to be reassured or protected varies. Donors are clearly one group in 
need of protection/reassurance.  The Philanthropy Australia code is interesting not least 
because it is the only code considered here which explicitly lists operating in accordance 
with the wishes of founders/donors as the first ‘principle’ of philanthropy. The Australian 
Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) code also functions as a means of reassuring 
donors. The code: ‘identifies mechanisms to ensure accountability in NGDO use of 
public monies’. The code is ‘about ensuring that signatories conduct their business with 
integrity, that they meet minimum standards of accountability in humanitarian responses, 
that they have policies to ensure child protection, that they commit to gender equity in 
the governance and management of the organisation, that they provide professional 
development to their staff …’. Thus ’The Code aims to maintain and enhance standards 
throughout the NGDO community, thereby ensuring that public confidence in the integrity 
of individuals and organisations comprising the NGDO community and in the quality and 
effectiveness of NGDO programs is well founded.’ In this case, the code functions as a 
form of risk management for various parties, including government. 
 
But donors (private and public) are not the only groups codes may aim to protect. For 
example, the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (hereafter referred to as the ICRC code) is 
designed to protect beneficiaries, and the reputation of international aid organisations 
themselves: ‘This Code of Conduct seeks to guard our standards of behaviour. It is not 
about operational details, such as how one should calculate food rations or set up a 
refugee camp. Rather, it seeks to maintain (the) high standards of independence, 
effectiveness and impact ….’ (The ACFOA Code also refers to the ICRC, and other, 
international codes). 
 
Protecting organisations from government ‘interference’ or legislation may be a powerful 
motive for code creation in both business and the non-profit sectors. But self-regulation, 
via codes, may also fulfil other functions. Codes can be seen as aiming to maintain the 
reputation of the non-profit industry as a whole, raise barriers to entry and build the basis 
for a system of quality brand name agencies (Sogge and Zadek, 1996, 82). Similarly, 
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their communication of normative views of ‘acceptable’ organisational behaviour codes 
may be seen as tools of national and global isomorphism (Ebrahim, 2003).  
 
Codes vary on a number of dimensions. Codes may set minimum standards or good 
practice or best practice. Some codes openly acknowledge that the purpose is 
aspirational. The Association of Charitable Foundations (ACF) code is presented as a 
set of ‘guidelines’ and states: ‘it is hoped that all funders will aspire to them, and follow 
them as much as individual circumstances and resources permit’. Similarly, the 
Philanthropy Australia code aims to ‘foster good practice’.  
 
Codes, in all sectors, are often voluntary. So, for example, ACF notes: ‘The diverse 
range of interests and sectors represented by these organisations means that the 
Guidelines …. will not always apply to every funder’. Similarly, the ICRC code: ’is a 
voluntary code, enforced by the will of the organisation accepting it to maintain the 
standards laid down in the Code’; and the Philanthropy Australia code provides 
‘recommendations’ to its members.  
Some codes are clearly regulatory. But regulatory codes vary in the type and strength of 
sanctions attached to them. The sanction for breaching some codes is loss of 
membership of the organisation – which may or may not be an effective sanction. In 
other cases, breach of the code may lead to loss of accreditation or other badges of 
acceptability; but again, depending on the nature of the market, the authority of the 
accrediting agency, and the resources of the ‘transgressor’, this may or may not 
constitute a strong sanction. Loss of income, or significant loss of status, is probably the 
strongest sanction. Only one of the examples considered below has this strong sanction 
attached to it. The ACFOA code forms the basis for a complaints and compliance 
procedure and, more importantly, functions explicitly as part of the accreditation process 
which acts as a gateway to government funding. Failure to comply with the code entails 
being removed as a signatory to the Code and loss of membership of ACFOA and, if the 
agency is accredited with AusAid, loss of accreditation and thus loss of that source of 
funding. 
Given the heterogeneity and ideology of independence within the non-profit sector, 
voluntary codes are almost certainly more common than regulatory codes. Another 
problem with regulatory codes is that to be effective they have to be enforced and that 
requires time, mechanisms and resources. 
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Finally, codes vary in content. Some codes set out basic principles; others focus on 
structure and process; yet others aim to cover both principle and practice. 
Domestic Codes 
1. Philanthropy Australia Code of Practice 
This code is voluntary, offering ‘recommendations’ to Philanthropy Australia members. 
Its aim is ‘to encourage best practice, openness and transparency in all aspects of 
grantmaking’. It focuses primarily on process. The code covers: 
• Principles of Good Practice – these include operating in accordance with the wishes 
of the founder/donors; commitment to development and promotion of ‘innovative, 
flexible and effective responses’ to modern challenges; and acceptance by 
grantmakers that in ‘fulfilling their particular role in helping build a just, sustainable 
and pluralistic society, it is important that there is openness, transparency, integrity, 
accountability and self-regulation in the provision of resources to grantees’. 
• Legal responsibilities – basically setting out the legal responsibilities of trustees. 
• Procedures – including the need for clarity and regular review of purposes; 
communicating purposes and procedures to the public; compliance with the privacy 
legislation; communication to grantseekers of monitoring, evaluation and reporting 
requirements; the need to be responsive to changing conditions in society and the 
‘needs and merits’ of grantseekers; the value of obtaining independent, 
knowledgeable ideas and advice. 
• Governance – including the importance of having an identifiable and properly 
constituted decision making body (Board); clear definition of the obligations of the 
Board, decision making procedures and authority to speak on behalf of the 
organization; providing information on activities to the public; prudent management 
and investment practices and sensitivity to conflicts of interest.  
 
Finally, grantmakers are ‘encouraged to maintain interaction with others in the field of 
philanthropy including Philanthropy Australia and its associated affinity groups as well as 
relevant state and national organizations’. Furthermore, ‘Grantmakers are encouraged to 
share with others responsibility for strengthening the effectiveness of the many private 
and corporate philanthropic initiatives that serve the needs and interests of the Australian 
community’ (Philanthropy Australia, 2002). 
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2. Guidelines for Funders (Association of Charitable Foundations, UK)  
ACF’s code of practice is a set of ‘aspirational’, voluntary ‘guidelines’. The Guidelines 
focus on process issues, covering: 
• Access to funding  - Clear and timely publication of opportunities for funding and 
policies and processes; user-friendly application forms and accompanying 
instructions; special steps to ensure fair and equal access to information and funding 
across geographical areas; for black and ethnic minority groups; for groups from 
different religious and cultural backgrounds; for disadvantaged groups; and for those 
with special needs. 
• Processing grant applications – Clarity, timeliness and fairness. 
• Decision-making – Clear internal procedures for making grant decisions; 
arrangements to avoid conflict of interest; prompt notification of decisions; giving 
principal reasons for a refusal to make a grant. 
• Selecting whom to fund – Judging applications on substance rather than 
presentation; dealing with diversity of funding sources, matching funding, double 
funding; ensuring grant recipients’ commitment to equal opportunities in terms of their 
own personnel policies and the delivery of services to their clients.  
• Payment procedures – Written confirmation of the grant offer and any conditions 
before payment is made; clear statement and content of grant conditions and 
arrangements for payment; monitoring and evaluation arrangements; and the 
circumstances in which funding might be terminated; payments in advance; agreed 
schedule of payments. 
• Monitoring & evaluation – Appropriate measures of performance and outcome/output 
agreed at the outset; proportionality in monitoring and evaluation; appropriate levels 
of financial information and independent verification of accounts; clear, agreed 
arrangements for terminating funding in the event of unsatisfactory performance or 
breach of grant conditions.  
• Dissemination – Encouraging organisations to disseminate the results of projects of 
general interest; making provision in the grant for dissemination; dissemination by 
funders where the results of evaluations would be useful for other funders and 
voluntary organisations. 
• Changes to funding – Giving as much notice as possible of any changes in grant 
scheme policy or management arrangements; consultation of grant recipients prior to 
changes; adequate notice of termination.  
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3. Principles and Practices for Effective Grantmaking (Council on Foundations) 
The Council on Foundations’ Principles and Practices for Effective Grantmaking were 
first approved by the board of directors in 1980. In 1982, the board required that all 
members subscribe to the principles and practices. Thus this code is, in theory at least, 
different from the two previous codes in that it is intended to have some regulatory 
function, sanctioned by loss of membership of the Council. It is, however, similar to the 
two previous codes in being concerned primarily with structure and process, 
emphasising the need for: 
• A set of basic policies that define the program interest and the fundamental 
objectives to be served. 
• An identifiable board, committee or other decision making body with clear 
responsibility for determining those policies and procedures. 
• Clear and logical processes for receiving, examining and deciding on grant 
applications consistent with the organisation's policies and purposes. 
• Recognition that accountability extends beyond the narrow requirements of the law 
and policies that recognize these multiple obligations for accountability: to the charter 
provisions by which their founders defined certain basic expectations, to those 
charitable institutions they serve, to the general public, to the Internal Revenue 
Service and to certain state governmental agencies. 
• Open communications with the public and with grantseekers about the policies and 
procedures that are followed in grantmaking  
• A brief written statement about policies, program interests, grantmaking practices, 
geographic and policy restrictions, and preferred ways of receiving applications; 
prompt acknowledgment of the receipt of any serious application; prompt notification 
of steps and dates for decisions. 
• Ways of informing the public concerning the foundation’s stewardship through 
publication and distribution of periodic reports, newsletters, and so on. 
• Relationships between grantors and grantee based on mutual respect, candor and 
understanding, with each investing the necessary time and attention to define clearly 
the purposes of the grant, expectations regarding reports related to financial and 
other matters and the provisions for evaluating and publicizing projects. 
• Responsiveness to changing conditions in society and to the changing needs and 
merits of particular grantseeking organisations, via independent inquiries, special 
knowledge, experience and insight of individuals beyond those persons, families or 
corporations from which the funds originally came; attention to equal opportunities in 
the composition of decision making bodies/processes.  
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• Regular review of program interests, basic policies, board and staff composition, and 
assessment of the overall results of grantmaking. 
• Procedures for ensuring against accusations of self-interest.  
• Interaction with others in the field of philanthropy.  
 
 
Codes for Grantmaking in Disaster 
 
The next two codes specifically relate to grantmaking in disasters. Given that when these 
codes were developed there were already various codes of practice for grantmaking 
(EFC and CoF, for example, already had grantmaking codes) and international aid, the 
creation of these codes is interesting in itself. ‘Disasters’ were presumably seen as 
requiring special principles and practices not covered by existing codes. While the notion 
that disasters are, almost by definition, different has some obvious logic, when we look at 
the content of the code it is not clear why the principles and practices outlined are not 
equally applicable to all grantmaking.  
 
Both of the following codes, like the two above, are voluntary but both are very different 
from the domestic codes above, and, in many respects, from each other. 
 
1. Disaster Grantmaking: A Practical Guide for Foundations and Corporations 
(European Foundation Centre and Council on Foundations) 
 
The EFC and CoF code was created by a specially convened Working Group in 2000. 
The Working Group produced: Disaster Grantmaking: A Practical Guide for Foundations 
and Corporations (EFC and COF November 2001) identifying eight principles of good 
disaster management. 
 
The Guide begins by noting that approaches to disasters have changed in recent years 
shifting from a narrow concept of providing quick disaster relief based on charitable 
impulse to a broader concept of disaster management taking in community involvement 
in prevention and preparedness, mitigation, emergency relief, rehabilitation and long-
term development that incorporates prevention and preparedness. The aim is to reduce 
people’s vulnerability to natural hazards; disasters are no longer seen as natural or 
inevitable but the result of social, economic and political factors that cause certain 
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populations to be vulnerable to impact of hazards. This requires a long term perspective 
that addresses root causes as well as immediate needs. 
 
The Guide goes on to emphasise the variety of actors involved – governments, 
multilateral institutions and so on, as well as local organisations who know what help is 
appropriate and who is hardest hit. In this situation the key roles of foundations and 
corporate grantmakers in disaster management are said to be: 
• ‘A mission to serve the public good in diverse ways 
• Ongoing relationships with local organisations 
• A long-term perspective, often five to ten years or more 
• An ability to convene key actors across sectors and to serve as a catalyst for               
            cross-sector collaboration 
• A capacity to call attention to political, economic and social policies that 
exacerbate the vulnerability of populations to hazards 
• Experience supporting research and disseminating results to interested 
parties 
• Programmatic flexibility that permits them to respond creatively and 
strategically to disaster situations 
• Administrative flexibility that permits timely action’ (p 6-7). 
 
The Guide’s key principles of good disaster grantmaking are: 
• First, do no harm – ‘Aim to ensure that your grant contributes to the solution 
not the problem’; 
• Stop, look and listen before taking action – information is key to good disaster  
grantmaking; 
• Don’t act in isolation;  
• Think beyond the immediate crisis to the long-term; 
• Bear in mind the expertise of local organisations; 
• Find out how prospective grantees operate;  
• Be accountable to those you are trying to help ‘Grantmakers are accountable,  
not only to their donors, boards and shareholders but also to the people they 
seek to assist ‘(p10);   
• Communicate your work widely and use it as an educational tool.  
 
 More specifically, it is suggested that foundations should adopt the following practices. 
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1. Develop an internal plan for handling disaster requests, including internal guidelines and 
criteria for when and where you will make disaster grants and internal decision-making 
procedures for disaster grants; identify potential grantee partners in advance. 
2. Learn about the disaster situation from an experienced international aid organisation or 
reputable local organisation rather than relying on media or government reports. 
3. Think about when to make a disaster grant and consider supporting disaster prevention 
before it happens and/or splitting a grant into two parts – one for immediate relief and the 
other for later recovery and long-term development. 
4. Decide whether to provide cash assistance, or goods and services, bearing in mind that 
cash is nearly always preferable because it allows greater flexibility and boosts local 
economies while reducing transport costs. 
5. Look at the total disaster management picture; consider grants aimed at: disaster 
prevention and preparedness, gaps between relief and long-term development, conflict 
resolution or supporting care of refugees displaced, strengthening local organisational 
capacity to respond to future disasters, research on root causes of disasters, how people 
traditionally coped and what modern technology can contribute. Include funds to 
disseminate results. 
6. Choosing a grantee – including options for channelling support via multilateral 
organisations, government agencies, international, national, local NGOs and so on. Look 
for grantees that support long-term community and economic development programs. 
7. Coordinate disaster grants with others, explore partnerships and cooperation with other 
grantmakers, identify gaps that need filling and communicate what you are doing. 
8. Set up procedures for monitoring and evaluating disaster grants using on-site monitoring 
where possible and make reporting requirements clear to grantees. Include assessment 
of wider social impact of the grant and try to use evaluation as a learning exercise with 
grantees as part of longer term development programme to improve future grant 
effectiveness. 
9. Enhance understanding of disasters by educating boards, employees, donors and 
shareholders about the disaster cycle and how  to apply a comprehensive disaster 
management approach; work with the media to raise public awareness and disaster 
coverage that goes beyond personal stories to root causes of disasters – political, 
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2. The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 
NGOs in Disaster Relief.  
 
This voluntary code, prepared jointly by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies and the ICRC, provides a code of conduct along with three annexes, 
describing the working environment that ‘we would like to see created by Host Governments, 
Donor Governments and Inter-governmental Organisations in order to facilitate the effective 
delivery of humanitarian assistance’. The Code of Conduct was sponsored by a range of 
larger international aid organisations. Again it is interesting to note that this code specifically 
relates to disasters, defined as ‘a calamitous event resulting in loss of life, great human 
suffering and distress, and large scale material damage’.  
 
The principles are:  
1. The Humanitarian imperative comes first. The right to receive humanitarian 
assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be 
enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. Aid is not a partisan or political act.  
2.  Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without 
adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone. 
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. 
Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families and 
communities and will not be tied to acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.  
4.  NGHAs are agencies which act independently from governments.  
5.  Culture and custom shall be respected. 
6. Disaster responses should be based on local capacities; working through local 
partners in planning and implementation, co-operating with local government structures 
where appropriate, and properly co-ordinating emergency responses. 
7.  Programme beneficiaries should be involved in the management of relief aid. 
8.  Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting 
basic needs. Long term development and sustainability are key issues.  
9. Organisations should hold themselves accountable to both ‘beneficiaries’ and funders. 
‘Our programmes will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise in 
order to minimise the wasting of valuable resources’. 
10.  In information, publicity and advertising activities, disaster victims are recognised as 
dignified humans, not hopeless objects. 
 
Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 14 Working Paper No. CPNS23 
 
Some ‘indicative guidelines’ follow the Code, describing the working environment  
signatories to the Code would like to see created by donor governments, host 
governments and the inter-governmental organisations – principally the agencies of the 
United Nations – in order to facilitate effective disaster responses. Three Annexes set 
out recommendations to the governments of disaster affected countries, to donor 
governments, and inter-governmental organisations.  
 
An International Code: the ACFOA Code of Conduct 
The ACFOA Code of Conduct is different from the codes above in several respects. It 
differs from the EFC/CoF and the ICRC codes in that it is an international code but not 
specifically concerned with grantmaking in disasters; it is also different in being country 
specific (i.e. restricted to organisations based in Australia) and perhaps partly for that 
reason is more detailed in its recommendations. 
 
The major difference between the ACFOA Code and all of the other codes considered 
above lies in its status. It is a disciplinary code setting standards ‘to which signatories to 
the Code will be bound and against which the Complaints and Compliance Process will 
be assessed’. Failure to co-operate with the inquiry and reconciliation process is itself a 
breach of the Code, and the ACFOA code is backed by strong sanctions. 
 
The ACFOA story 
 
Before looking at the content of the ACFOA code it is worth telling the story of its 
creation and operation. The immediate trigger for construction of the code was a highly 
publicized scandal concerning one respected international aid organisation. Following 
the public scandal the Minister of the day established a Non Government Development 
Organisation Code of Practice Advisory Committee (COPAC) to investigate the issue. 
Members included a donor representative, two MPs, two NGO representatives, one 
AusAid representative and one accountant. COPAC recommended the establishment of 
a Code of Conduct. In fact, a rudimentary code of ethics already existed. This had 
developed out of ACFOA members’ concerns about inappropriate fundraising images. 
As one person involved said: ’If aid organisations didn’t understand why the code was 
necessary before … they certainly did afterwards’. 
 
The code was deliberately set at the level of minimum standards ‘things they should be 
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doing anyway as legally incorporated bodies’. One of the key features of the code is that 
it requires reporting on a specific template so that the public can make meaningful 
comparisons between organisations ‘giving the public more information to make 
choices’. Reporting to a template also allows ACFOA to develop benchmarks. 
 
Originally, the aim was to give the general public a tool to act as watchdogs, but it is now 
recognized that this was a high expectation for two reasons. First, the public need to be 
aware of the code. Second: ‘With the best will in the world very few people are going to 
follow it up. They believe there is a watchdog out there and want to leave trust to other 
people’.  
 
Every year ACFOA monitors the financial and annual reports of all code signatories. 
Although the Chair of the Code of Conduct Committee can be called upon by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to discuss or report on activities or decisions, the Committee is 
seen as independent, administered by ACFOA, reporting to the ACFOA AGM and 
Council. An independent chair, not drawn from the sector, is seen as vital in offering 
independent donor protection and ensuring that ‘the industry can’t cover up’. 
 
ACFOA attaches considerable significance to enabling organisations to comply with the 
code, providing a variety of training sessions to this end. In 2002, 5 organisations failed 
to comply with the code and ‘resigned’ from ACFOA. However, some suggest that it is 
important to be aware of how much of the code works behind the scenes via peer 
pressure. In some cases ‘threat of the use of the code is sufficient’. 
 
There are three steps and ways that sanctions operate, depending on the status of the 
organisation. First, non-compliance results in immediate loss of signatory status; 
organisations may reapply to become a Code signatory and will be accepted if they are 
assessed as fully compliant. Second, if the organisation is also a member of ACFOA, 
then the ACFOA Executive Committee is informed that the organisation is no longer 
compliant and thus no longer eligible for membership. In this case most organisations 
chose to resign rather than have their membership cancelled. Third, if the organisation is 
also accredited with AusAid, ACFOA formally notifies AusAid that they have been found 
non-compliant by the Code of Conduct Committee. 
 
The relationship between the Code and AusAid accreditation came about because, at 
roughly the same time as the code was constructed, the Federal government audit office 
was reviewing AusAid management of funding. This led to proposals to reform the 
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accreditation process that was seen as neither rigorous nor consistent. AusAid proposed 
a raft of criteria, some borrowed from the ACFOA code, and in a meeting between 
AusAid and ACFOA it was agreed to replace some of the AusAid criteria with compliance 
with the ACFOA code. In retrospect some ACFOA staff feel that this has led to confusion 
concerning the roles of AusAid and ACFOA. ACFOA is very clear that the code is a form 
of self-regulation, as well as self-improvement and quality. ACFOA informs AusAid of 
non-compliance after an investigation by the independent Code of Conduct Committee. 
Some tensions have arisen when AusAid has asked for prior information of likely non-
compliance. 
 
The ACFOA story suggests that a crisis/scandal can give a real impetus to development 
of codes, and that both independence and sanctions are important in ensuring 
compliance. Another reason why the code appears to be generally accepted by 
organisations is that the Committee is responsive to requests for clarification and 
change. ‘At the beginning there was a lot of wailing from organisations, now it’s accepted 




The ACFOA Code deals with its fundamental principles relating to the purposes and 
style of aid, briefly: ‘Organisations which are signatories to this Code aim to build 
creative and trusting relationships with the people of the developing countries and to 
meet program standards which : ‘give priority to the needs and interests of the people 
they serve; encourage self help and self-reliance among beneficiaries and thus avoid 
creating dependency; involve beneficiary groups to the maximum extent possible in the 
design, implementation and evaluation of projects and programs; respect and foster 
internationally recognised human rights, both socio-economic and civil-political; where 
possible seek to enhance gender equity; and are based on an understanding of the 
history and culture of the people served’. 
 
The Code then specifies in some detail the required internal organisational structures 
and processes for governance, organisational integrity, finances, communication with the 
public, management practices and human resources. 
 
Under Governance, the Code specifies that an organisation’s governing instruments 
should set out its basic goals and purposes and define the governance and membership 
structure in line with legislative requirements. There should be clearly defined lines of 
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authority between the governing body and management; clear policies specifying the 
frequency of its meetings (at least two per year) and the number of members required for 
a quorum; written policies covering appointment, termination and remuneration of 
members of the governing body and policies restricting the number of paid staff who are 
voting members of the governing body; procedures for dealing with conflict of interest. 
There should be clear policies and practices for financial control by the governing body 
and for open and accurate disclosure of information concerning its goals, programs, 
finances and governance. An annual general meeting of its members should be held at 
which the annual audited financial statements are received and an independent auditor 
appointed.  
 
Organisational integrity requires that, in all of its activities and particularly its 
communications to the public, an organisation should show respect to the dignity, values, 
history, religion, and culture of the people with whom it works. The organisation should 
be voluntary and not-for-profit. It should take prompt and firm corrective action against 
bribery, corruption and wrong-doing. It should have procedures for encouraging and 
dealing with ‘whistle blowing’. The organisation should not denigrate other agencies, or 
make misleading or false public statements regarding other agencies. 
 
Under Finances, the Code specifies internal control procedures that minimise the risk of 
misuse of funds and reporting mechanisms which facilitate accountability to donors; 
adequate procedures for the review and monitoring of income and expenditure; 
publication of an Annual Report with a financial report in accordance with the Standard 
NGDO Financial Reporting Format annexed to this Code and audited by at least a 
qualified accountant who is a member of the Australian Society of Certified Practicing 
Accountants or the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia or by a Registered 
Company Auditor. Donations should be used as promised or implied in fundraising 
appeals or as requested by the donor; there should be plans for handling any excess; 
use of ratios in publications should be accompanied by a note explaining how these have 
been determined. 
 
Communication with the public requires an Annual Report provided to inquirers upon 
request. This should include a statement of the organisation’s goals or purposes, a short-
form financial statement, a summary of overall program activities and names, 
qualifications and experience of current members of the governing body. Fundraising 
messages should be truthful with no material omissions or exaggerations of fact, no use 
of misleading photographs, nor any other communication which would tend to create a 
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false impression or misunderstanding. In all fundraising activities, there should be 
policies to protect donors’ rights to privacy and information. The organisation should be 
accountable for all fundraising activities conducted under its authority, and should have 
written contracts with professional fundraisers. 
 
Under Management Practice and Human Resources, the Code specifies that the 
organisation should have clear policies and procedures relating to paid staff and 
volunteers working in Australia or overseas, clearly defining and protecting their rights, 
safety and fair treatment. 
 
Differences Between Codes 
 
In addition to the major difference in status and sanctions between the ACFOA code and 
all other codes above, one other difference is worth highlighting.  
 
The three domestic codes are almost exclusively concerned with grantmaking 
procedures, governance and management, accountability and fundraising practices and 
so on. The EFC/CoF (disaster) code, and to an extent the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent code, by contrast, focuses on purposes, values and principles including 
relationships with others; it emphases foundations’ roles in discovering causes of 
problems, prevention, education, avoiding dependency, building capacity, and working 
long term.  
 
EFC/CoF recognition of the complex ecology/interaction of institutions and of the value of 
local knowledge is equally relevant but less clearly spelt out in domestic grantmaking 
codes. Similarly, emphasis on a longer-term perspective and addressing the social, 
economic and political causes of problems has obvious relevance to all grantmaking at 
home and abroad in disaster and non-disaster situations. Interestingly, however, these 
emphases are not obviously apparent in codes of practice dealing with domestic non-
disaster grantmaking. Again, there is only token mention in domestic codes of 
accountability to beneficiaries or of the need to co-ordinate work with others including 
government.  
 
The differences between domestic and international disaster codes raise some 
interesting questions. Why do code creators feel able to state values and principles in 
relation to disaster grantmaking and not in relation to domestic grantmaking? Do the 
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same values and principles not apply to domestic grantmaking? Or is it rather that 
foundations can agree on what they do ‘over there’ but not at home? More 
fundamentally, do foundations working internationally operate with different theories of 
problems and change as compared with those they operate with at home? Are 
international problems seen as structural in a way that domestic ones are not? 
 
Strengths and Limitations of Codes  
 
Codes are constructed in particular legal, social and political contexts. This has a 
number of implications. Codes of practice are always supplementary to any legal 
requirements relating to the activities covered by the code, and have to be read in the 
context of wider laws and codes.  For example, as ACFOA notes: ‘NGDOs are required 
to meet a range of state and federal legal obligations which are presumed in this Code. 
These obligations may include corporations laws, rules of incorporation of associations, 
fundraising and charitable institutions legislation, equal employment opportunity 
principles, occupational health and safety standards and anti discrimination legislation, 
intellectual property and copyright legislation and other codes of ethics’. This is one 
reason why codes constructed in one jurisdiction may not travel well to another. 
 
The fact that codes are socially and politically constructed also means that they reflect 
the concerns that gave rise to them, and the purposes for which they were constructed.  
So, for example, the ACFOA code was born from an episode of loss of trust in the 
governance and management of Australian international aid organisations, and its focus 
clearly reflects those concerns and the purposes of reassuring donors, especially 
government donors, that these organisations are properly run, including ensuring 
protection for beneficiaries and care and professional development of staff. 
 
Because codes are socially and politically constructed, they are also socially and 
politically constrained by the differences in values and viewpoints of those constructing 
them and to whom they apply. This is clearly illustrated in ACF’s statement that the 
diversity of foundations is such that the (ACF) code cannot be equally applied to all – the 
code is ‘aspirational’. Foundations in the UK are highly protective of their independence 
and pride their diversity, and do not accept ‘direction’. 
 
How important are codes of practice? As noted above, one important function of codes is 
to reassure donors and regulators that things are ‘in hand’. Codes are a form of before 
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the event risk-management. As such they may take the place of the on-going monitoring 
by funders that many organisations regard as both overly time consuming and intrusive. 
But self-regulatory codes may also function in ways that cut-off rather than prompt 
questioning of conduct; such codes are also subject to the criticism that they are nothing 
more than ‘the most watered down common denominator stance and statement’ 
(Crooke, 1997, 14). 
 
Codes alone cannot guarantee that things are being ‘properly’ governed and managed, 
and ‘proper’ governance and management do not, in any case, guarantee effective 
pursuit of roles and purposes. An organisation may comply with all of the requirements of 
a process based code and still be ineffective in achieving its goal of, say, reducing 
poverty. 
 
The primary job of codes is to reduce transaction costs – we replace trust in 
organisations with trust in the code. The code is our comfort blanket. But unfortunately 
codes cannot do all that is expected of them, and may do some things which are not 
intended. Codes, like audits, can create the distrust they presuppose and/or they can 
lead to all sorts of ‘organisational pathologies and fatal remedies’ (Power, 1997) if the 
organisations become driven by compliance with the code rather than the fundamental 
purposes of the organisation. 
 
With some exceptions, domestic codes tend to be silent on roles, relationships, values 
and principles of giving and on the theories of change, solutions and intervention with 
which grantmakers operate. The job of codes, as noted above, is primarily to tell us 
about processes and structures rather than about goals, values and approaches. But 
even if we assumed that certain structures and procedures could guarantee 
effectiveness, codes alone appear to be relatively weak tools.  
 
The evidence suggests that codes, in all sectors, without strong and consistently applied 
sanctions achieve rather little (King and Lennox, 2000). For example, implementation of 
The International Council of Voluntary Agencies guidelines for relations between 
Northern and Southern NGOs has been a problem because agencies cannot enforce 
them (Saxby, 1996, 57). Similarly, when AmeriCares pulled out of the US agency 
InterAction because it found the code of ethics too strict it did so with impunity (Sogge 
and Zadek, 1996, 82). Similarly, a survey of major US domestic foundations suggested 
that few had taken any action to ensure that codes were implemented, and many had 
difficulty in even naming the codes (Bothwell, 2001). 
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But this does not necessarily mean that codes are unimportant. Codes may function as 
important symbolic statements of how things ought to be, providing aspirational 
standards and mental and practice traffic lights. Codes may serve to shape standards 
and provide tools in the process of normative isomorphism. 
 
Codes are important but they need to be understood for what they are. Codes are one of 
a range of tools designed to do a particular job. The danger is that codes provide more 
comfort than they warrant, acting as a means of closing off information, criticism and 
questions rather than stimulating more (Day and Klein, 1987). There are some jobs they 
cannot do. Codes may tell us if organisations are road-worthy, but they cannot tell us the 
directions in which organisations could or should be heading and the knowledge and 
values on which such decisions are based. There is now an urgent need to turn our 
attention to some of those neglected tasks including that of debating the roles, values 
and principles of philanthropic giving in a global society with new problems and new 
political agendas. 
 
** I am grateful to staff of ACFOA for providing the interviews and written comments for 
parts of this paper. Thanks are also due to colleagues at the Centre for Philanthropy and 
Nonprofit Studies, especially Lara Cain, and to The Myer Foundation for funding the 
Fellowship of which this paper is one product.  
 
References 
Anheier, H. and Leat, D. (2002) From Charity to Creativity: Philanthropic Foundations in 
the 21st Century, Comedia. 
 
Association of Charitable Foundations, Guidelines for Funders of Voluntary 
Organisations, Association of Charitable Foundations, London. 
 
Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) (2002) ACFOA Code Integrity, Values and 
Accountability, and Guidance Document, ACFOA, Deakin, ACT, Australia. 
 
Bothwell, R (2001) Trends in Self-Regulation and Transparency of Nonprofits in the US, 
The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law , 2, 3. 
 
Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, P, (2000) Global Business Regulation, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
 
Brown, K., Kenny, S., Turner, B. with Prince, J. (2000) Rhetorics of Welfare Uncertainty, 
Choice and Voluntary Associations, Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke. 
 
Bruce, I. and Leat, D. (1993) Management for Tomorrow, VOLPROF, City University 
Business School, London. 
Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 22 Working Paper No. CPNS23 
 
 
Cadbury, A (1997) Why Boards the World over Need to target Quality of Performance, 
Focus, Fall 97, Egon Zehnder International,  Hamburg, 19-26. 
 
Council on Foundations (1982)  Principles and Practices  for Effective Grantmaking,  
Council on Foundations, Washington. 
 
Cox, E. (1995) A Truly Civil Society: 1995 Boyer Lectures, ABC Books, Sydney. 
 
Crooke, M. (1997) Development Dilemmas Understanding the difficulties of practical 
altruism, ACFOA development issues, 1. 
 
Crimm, N. (2002) Shortcomings in America’s Federal Tax Regulatory Regime of Private 
Foundations: Insights for Australia, Australian Tax Review, 31, 2, 90-118. 
 
Day, P and Klein, R. (1987) Accountabilities Five Public Services, Tavistock 
Publications, London. 
 
Ebrahim, A. (2003) Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGO’s, World 
Development, 31, 5, 813-829. 
 
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1995) Beyond the magic Bullet: NGO’s – Performance and 
Accountability, Earthscan, London. 
 
European Foundation Centre and the Council on Foundations (2001) Disaster 
Grantmaking: A Practical Guide for Foundations and Corporations, EFC and CoF. 
 
Fleishman, J.L. (1999) Public Trust in Not-for-Profit Organisations and the Need for  
Regulatory Reform, in Clotfelter, C.T. & Ehrlich, T. (eds) Philanthropy and the Nonprofit 
Sector in a Changing America, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 
172-197. 
 
Gibelman, M. and Gelman, S. R. (2001) Very public scandals: Nongovernmental 
organisations in trouble, Voluntas, 12, 1, 49-66.  
 
Henley Centre, The (1997a) Planning for Social Change 1996/7, The Henley Centre, 
London. 
 
Henley Centre, The (1997b) Planning for Social Change 1998, The Henley Centre, 
London. 
 
Howell, J. and Pearce, J. (2000) Civil Society: Technical Instrument or Social Force for 
Change?, in D. Lewis and T. Wallace (eds) New Roles and relevance, Development 
NGO’s and the Challenge of Change, Connecticut, Kumarian Press, 75-85. 
 
Ilchman, W.F. and Burlingame, D.F. (1999) Accountability in a Changing Philanthropic 
Environment: Trustees and Self-Government at the End of the Century, in C.T. Clotfelter 
and T. Ehrlich (eds) Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a Changing America,  
Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 198-211. 
 
Independent Sector (1994) Giving and Volunteering 1994, Independent Sector, 
Washington. 
 
International Red Cross et al., The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement and NGO’s in Disaster Relief, ICRC, Geneva. 
Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 23 Working Paper No. CPNS23 
 
 
King, A. and Lennox,M.J. (2000), Industry Self-regulation without Sanctions: The 
Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, Academy of Management Journal, 43, 
4, pp.698-716. 
 
Kramer, R. (1990) Change and Continuity in British Voluntary Organizations, 1976 to 
1988, Voluntas, 1 (2), 33-60. 
 
Kramer, R. (1987) Voluntary Agencies and the Personal Social Services, in W.W.Powell 
(ed), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press. 
 
Leat, D. (1988) Accountability of Voluntary Organisations, NCVO, London. 
 
Leat, D. (1990) Voluntary Organizations and Accountability: Theory and Practice, in 
H.Anheier and W.Seibel (eds) The Third Sector: Comparative Studies of Nonprofit 
Organizations, de Gruyter, Berlin. 
 
Leat, D. (2002) Working on Governance and Accountability, Philanthropy Australia with 
Deakin University, Melbourne. 
 
Lewis, D. and T. Wallace (eds) New Roles and Relevance, Development NGO’s and the 
Challenge of Change,  Connecticut, Kumarian Press, 
 
McIlnay, D.P. (1998) How Foundations Work, Jossey Bass Publishers, San Francisco. 
 
Ogus, A.I. (2001) (ed) Regulation, Economics and the Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 
Cheltenham. 
 
Philanthropy Australia (2002) Code of Conduct, http://www.philanthropy.org.au. 
 
Power, M. (1997) The Audit Society Rituals of Verification, Oxford University Press. 
 
Raffer, K and Singer, H.W. (1996) The Foreign Aid Business: Economic Assistance and 
Development Co-operation, Cheltenham UK and Brookfield US, Edward Elgar. 
 
Salamon, LM (1997) Holding the Center America's Nonprofit Sector at a Crossroads, A 
Report for the Nathan Cummings Foundation, The Nathan Cummings Foundation, New 
York. 
 
Siska, D.  2001 Special Section: Accountability Accountability, Updated, http://www. 
foundationnews.org/CME/article.cfm). 
 
Sogge, D. and Zadek,S. 1996, ‘Laws’ of the Market in D. Sogge, with K. Biekart and 
Saxby, J. Compassion and Calculation, The Business of Private Foreign Aid, London, 
Pluto Press, 68-96. 
 
Van der Ploeg, T. (1999) A Comparative Legal Analysis of Foundations: Aspects of 
Supervision and Transparency in H.K. Anheier and S. Toepler (eds) Private Funds, 
Public Purpose, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York, 55-77. 
 
